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CONCEPT REPRESENTATION ANALYSIS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF HUMAN-MACHINE INTERACTIONS  
Farshad Badie 
Center For Linguistics, Aalborg University  
Rendsburggade 14, 9000 Aalborg, Denmark  
ABSTRACT 
This article attempts to make a conceptual and epistemological junction between human learning and machine learning. I 
will be concerned with specifying and analysing the structure of concepts in the common ground between a  
concept-based human learning theory and a concept-based machine learning paradigm. I will focus on (i) humans’  
conceptual representations in the framework of constructivism (as an educational theory of learning and a proper model 
of knowing) and constructionism (as a theory for conceptualising learning) and (ii) concept representations in the 
framework of inductive concept learning (as an inductive machine learning paradigm). The results will support figuring 
out the most significant key points for constructing a conceptual linkage between a human learning theory and a machine 
learning paradigm. Accordingly, I will construct a conceptual ground for expressing and analysing concepts in the 
common ground of human and informatics sciences and in the context of human-machine interplays. 
KEYWORDS 
Concept, Human Learning, Machine Learning, Constructivism, Constructionism, Inductive Concept Learning.  
1. MOTIVATION 
Regarding a very general definition, the act [and the role] of learning can be identified as related to acquiring 
new or modifying existing knowledge. Often, the ability to acquire knowledge is seen as a sign of, or even a 
prerequisite for, intelligent behaviour. I shall stress the fact that knowledge is a very complicated and 
sensitive term that must be used with caution. Considering the structures of human and information sciences 
and their interrelationships, I need to focus on specifying knowledge and on analysing the phenomenas that 
we can use under the label of ‘knowledge’. It seems quite important to investigate what the term ‘knowledge’ 
stands for (and can stand for) to be assumed and to be comprehensible in various frameworks of learning 
within different systems. This article attempts to construct a conceptual and epistemological linkage between 
human learning and machine learning and to analyse the structure and description of concepts in the common 
ground between a theory (and a philosophy) in the framework of human learning and a paradigm in the 
framework of machine learning. Before getting into the details, I contemplate the term ‘Machine Learning’. 
Later on, I focus on knowledge to provide a proper background for my desired contributions. 
Machine Learning has been recognised as a subfield of Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science. 
According to [Mitchell (1997)], “A machine learning approach attempts to develop strong algorithms that 
allow machines to improve [the productivity of] their performances on a given goal [and on an objective 
function]”. In machine learning, the word ‘learning’ has been utilised as a binary predicate for machine. 
Learning as a binary predicate describes a role that is being performed by a machine. It is important to focus 
on the term ‘learning’ within the context of the analysis of knowledge. My main goal is figuring out the most 
significant key points for building a conceptual link between humans and machines. 
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In order to analyse knowledge I take Bloom’s taxonomy 1  into consideration. This taxonomy is a 
framework for classifying pedagogical objectives, which could be interpreted as the statements of what 
teachers [, tutors and mentors] expect their learners to have learned, see [Furst (1956), Krathwohl (2002)]. 
Consequently, knowledge has a strong relationship with recognition of materials, ideas, methods, processes, 
structures and settings. Bloom’s taxonomy divides a body of knowledge into multiple classes like, e.g.,  
knowledge of terminologies, knowledge of ways and means, knowledge of trends and sequences, knowledge 
of classifications and categorisations, knowledge of methodologies, knowledge of universals and 
abstractions, knowledge of principles and generalisations, knowledge of theories and structures. Later on, 
[Krathwohl (2002)] has proposed a knowledge dimension in the revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy. The 
revised taxonomy consists of four categories: (1) Factual Knowledge (e.g., terminological knowledge), (2) 
Procedural Knowledge (e.g., knowledge of methods and algorithms), (3) Conceptual Knowledge (e.g., 
knowledge of theories, models and structures) and (4) Metacognitive Knowledge (e.g., contextual 
knowledge, conditional knowledge). According to this categorisation I can say that “knowledge acquisition 
consists of a sort of transformation of functions from reality into the sets and categories of facts, procedures, 
concepts and contexts”. The human being has this ability to deal with multiple classes of facts, procedures, 
concepts and contexts and can transform them into her/his mind. Transformations can be interpreted as the 
outcomes of self-involvement in increasing knowledge about a subject matter. In human systems a learner is 
someone who intentionally attempts to know more about something in order to construct her/his knowledge 
about that thing. Any human has a background knowledge and tackles to carry on constructing knowledge 
over her/his existing knowledge. This consideration conduces me to observe and to interpret human 
knowledge acquisition (and human learning) as the activity of construction. Any person tackles to develop 
her/his constructed knowledge constructions and to gain an opportunity to attain deeper comprehensions, 
realisations and understandings. Also, human’s deeper understandings support her/his greater motivations. 
Here I feel the need to concentrate on conceptualisations in order to provide a supportive analysis of 
realisation and understanding. In my opinion, “a conceptualisation is an uniform specification of separated 
understandings. A conceptualisation provides a global manifestation of local understandings in the context of 
a human’s thoughts”. Additionally, a human’s grasp of concepts provides a proper foundation for generating 
her/his own conceptualisations. Also, the personal conceptualisation could be identified as the action or the 
process of forming a concept with regard to the basis that has been provided by the individual realisation. 
In this research I will mainly focus on concepts, conceptions and concept representations. I have believed 
that the main focus of process of knowledge acquisition (and learning) is on concepts and concept 
representations in the ground of conceptualisations. Knowledge acquisition based on concepts can be based 
on the following definition. This definition draws out the key elements, which have individual and social 
implications for intelligent learners, see [Watkins (2002)]. Knowledge acquisition is the reflective activity 
which enables the learner to draw upon her/his previous experiences (and her/his background knowledge) to 
conceptualise (and, respectively, understand) and evaluate the present, so as to build up and shape future 
actions and to construct (and develop) new knowledge. 
Let me go back to machines and machine learning. A machine program is said to learn from an 
experience if (i) there is a set of tasks for machine and (ii) there is a machine’s performance measure, and 
also if (iii) the machine’s performance at those tasks, as measured, improves with its experiences. Here I 
present a problem in human learning to make a comparison between human learning and machine learning. 
This example can clarify what the afore-mentioned concepts in a machine learning problem are. Suppose we 
think of the problem that focuses on students’ mathematical problem solving. Considering this problem, the 
most significant task of a student is to find proper solutions for mathematical problems. Then the set of tasks 
must consist of the student’s tasks and obligations for solving mathematical problems. Also, the performance 
measure could be known as the percentage of correctly solved problems. Additionally, the experience could 
consist of the existing transformations and alterations between observed problems and solved problems. 
Hence, a student can improve her/his ability in performing proper solutions for different mathematical 
problems after further experiments (experiencing more transformations). Subsequently, this student will have 
a better capability and more qualified competences in solving mathematical problems when more 
transformations (experiences) are provided for her/him. Providing more transformations for a student could 
                                               
1
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be achievable by showing and providing her/him with more positive (sample) and negative (non sample) 
examples of the solved mathematical problems.  
Here I shall claim that the word ‘learning’ in ‘machine learning’ is a metaphorical image and is a 
reflection of human knowledge acquisition and learning in machines and artificial agents. Let me express that 
machine learning is a metaphor that describes what ingredients and concepts are concerned with effective 
knowledge acquisition and learning within reality. Through my lenses, the most important concepts in a 
machine learning problem (e.g., problem, experience, task, performance, ability, learning) are conceptual 
reflections. They are some mappings from reality into usable and applicable labels.  
In the following sections I will focus on (i) humans’ conceptual representations in the framework of 
constructivism (as an educational theory of learning and a proper model of knowing) and constructionism (as 
a theory for conceptualising learning that could be identified as a complement for constructivism) and on (ii) 
hypothesis generation and concept representation in the framework of inductive concept learning (as a 
supervised machine learning paradigm). Accordingly, the main contribution of this research is figuring out 
the most significant key points for constructing a conceptual and epistemological linkage between a 
[concept-based] human learning theory and a [concept-based] machine learning paradigm. I will analyse the 
structural and logical specifications of concepts and conceptual representations and will analyse a common 
ground for expressing and analysing concepts in the context of human-machine interplays. I will also relate 
my specifications with Kantian account of schemata (and schemata-based concepts). Consequently, I will 
provide a list of the most significant transformations (from human into machine) and reflections (of human in 
machine) that make conjunctions between human learning and machine learning.  
2. CONCEPTUAL REPRESENTATION 
In this section I focus on (i) human conceptual representation in the framework of constructivism and 
constructionism and on (ii) hypothesis generation in the framework of inductive concept learning.  
2.1 Constructivism and Constructionism  
Constructivism is a philosophy that appears in a variety of guises, some of them pedagogical, some 
epistemological and some in complex combinations, see [Phillips (1995)]. In this research I see 
constructivism as a model of knowing with roots in philosophy, psychology and cybernetics that could 
support constructivist learning. In my opinion, the successful theories of learning are always getting 
supported by strong models of knowing, and thus, constructivism as a learning philosophy and as a theory of 
learning is highly dependent on constructivism as a model of knowing. According to these characteristics, it's 
possible to say that a successful theory of knowledge and an effective learning science may be constructed 
and developed based on the proper foundation that is provided by constructivism. Jean Piaget, the originator 
of constructivism, argued that all learning was mediated by the construction of mental objects that he called 
schemata. Schemata gradually develop into more conceptual mental entities, see [Bartlett (1932), Parker 
(2008)]. Let me explain the schemata in more detail. In constructivist learning the human’s mental structures 
manifest themselves in the form of schemata. The schemata demonstrate the human’s realisation of the 
world. They conceptually represent the constituents of human’s thoughts for knowledge acquisition with 
regard to her/his realisation of the world. Anyhow, in the framework of constructivism, a human being with 
respect to her/his pre-structured knowledge and her/his preconceptions attempts to develop the construction 
of knowledge. The most significant objective of constructivism is producing one’s own understanding of the 
world, see [Husen (1989), Keith Sawyer (2014), McGawand (2007)] for more detailed information. 
Constructionism is a framework central to the learning sciences, and it posits that learners create their 
own knowledge by the construction of conceptual representations. Constructionism focuses on 
conceptualising learning and on learning how a human can learn. Papert’s constructionism focuses more on 
the art of learning and on the significance of making and producing things in learning. Papert is interested in 
how learners engage in a relationship with [their own or other’s] knowledge construction(s) and in how these 
relations ultimately facilitate the construction of new knowledge. Constructionism is a constructivist learning 
theory. It shares constructivism’s view of learning as ‘building knowledge structures’ through progressive 
internalisation of action, see [Spiro (1991),  Ackermann (2002), Papert (1980)]. I may conclude that the main 
14th International Conference e-Society 2016
57
idea of constructionism is that human beings learn effectively through creating, constructing and developing 
things. Additionally, by adding experiences to the constructivism approach, constructionism attempts to 
conceptualise learning and to specify and analyse ‘learning to learn’. 
The most significant mutual objective of constructivism and constructionism is creating one’s own 
knowledge by constructing conceptual representations. According to [Hampton (2003)], conceptual 
representations are arguably the most important cognitive functions in humans. They stand at the centre of 
the information processing flow, with input from perceptual modules of differing kinds. Also, the most 
important building block of constructivism and constructionism is schemata, see [Bartlett (1932)]. Schemata 
provide a proper background for the learner’s concept (and conceptual) representations. They specify the 
learner’s inferences and can satisfy various conditions for definitions of truth. We saw that everything is 
about concepts and conceptual representations. Conceptual representations attempt to investigate the origins 
of human’s thought and roots of the constructed knowledge. In section 3 I will elaborate the description of 
schemata and will focus on structural and logical specifications of concepts as the key elements of the 
conceptual domains representation.  
2.2 Inductive Concept Learning  
Machine learning problems can be seen and analysed from different points of view and be divided into 
several categories. One categorisation could divide them into supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement 
learning methods. In supervised learning method the pair (input,output) training examples are supplied by a 
trainer who is a human. So, the learner that is a machine searches for function mappings from the inputs into 
the outputs. In this research I am concerned with ‘inductive learning from examples’, which is a subfield of 
supervised machine learning. To induce means to infer general principles and rules from specific facts as the 
instances. I shall emphasise that these facts are different from the facts presented in the revised Bloom’s 
taxonomy. All existing facts, procedures, concepts and contexts in Bloom’s taxonomy could be captured as 
some principles (i.e. actuality, objectivity and reality) in machines. In Inductive Learning, we describe the 
main terminologies, axioms and rules by descriptive logical languages, e.g., First Order Predicate Logic 
(FOL) and Description Logics (DLs). Inductive Concept Learning (ICL) is a specified Inductive Learning. 
ICL attempts to logically describe concepts and their relationships. It employs the members (instances) and 
non-members of a concept that may be known as a class. A characteristic feature of most inductive learning 
approaches is the use of background knowledge. This feature supports more complicated and specific 
learning scenarios, because not only the factual description of the given examples can be used by the 
machine, but structurally rich knowledge representations can be taken into account as well, see [Mitchell 
(1997), Lehmann (2010)]. In parallel with [Lavrac (1994)], I focus on specification of concept learning with 
background knowledge. In concept learning with background knowledge, a machine with regard to the given 
set of training examples and background knowledge finds a hypothesis. A hypothesis can be expressible in 
concept description languages. Also, based on the background knowledge and given examples (to machine) a 
hypothesis can be complete and consistent, i.e. correct. So, one may assume that a hypothesis is generated 
based on ideas and can determine the applications of a term and a phrase. Furthermore, a hypothesis is a 
significant part in the use of reason and language. It has a very strong dependency to the background 
knowledge. 
3. CONCEPTS: STRUCTURAL AND LOGICAL SPECIFICATIONS  
There has always been a general problem concerning the notion of ‘concept’, in philosophy, in linguistics, in 
psychology and in computer and information sciences. This research is focusing on knowledge acquisition  
and learning relying on concepts and concept representations. Thus I need to ascertain a realisable 
interrelationship between the description of concepts within human and information sciences. Actually, I am 
constructing a conceptual linkage between constructivism/constructionism and inductive concept learning. 
As mentioned, schemata provide proper backgrounds for the learner’s concept (and conceptual) 
representations. In a simplified version of Kantian philosophy a non-empirical (pure) concept has been 
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defined as a category. According to Kantian philosophy2, schemata are the procedural rules by which a 
category is associated with a sense impression. Kant claimed that the schemata provide a reference to 
intuition in a way similar to the manner of empirical concepts. According to the Kantian account of schemata 
there are three types of concepts that employ schemata. 
 
1. Empirical concepts3: For instance, the concept of Spring can describe a rule according to which human’s 
imagination can visualise a general figure of ‘a green season with beautiful trees and colourful flowers’ 
without being restricted and closed to any particular and specific shape produced by experience. 
 
2. Pure mathematical concepts4: They are the construction or mental drawing of what is common to several 
geometrical figures. They can be concerned with numbers, algebras and arithmetics. I shall stress that 
these concepts are not based on objective visual images. 
 
3. Pure concepts of the understanding5: They focus on characteristics, predicates, attributes, qualities or 
properties of an object, that are, also objects in general or as such. 
 
The third employs transcendental schemata, see [Kant (1781,1790,1999)]. Here I focus on some 
specifications of concepts and then relate them to the Kantian philosophy. Concepts are the furniture of 
human beings’ minds. A well furnished mind can be a source of successful knowledge acquisition and 
learning, see [Parker (2008)]. Concepts are realised (by some philosophers and psychologists) as 
representations of reality in mind. Regarding this grasp of concepts, they could be understood as some 
general objects and labels, where objects are the constituents of propositions that mediate between thought, 
language, and referents, see [Bartlett (1932)]. From these characteristics, I conclude that it’s possible to say 
that concepts might be understood to be the representations of actualities and objectivities in humans’ minds. 
The mental representations of actualities can affect the human’s languages. More precisely, a concept is may 
be said to be a linkage between linguistic expressions (descriptions) and the mental images (e.g., 
representations of the world, representations of inner experiences) that a human being has in her/his mind, 
see [Götzsche (2013)]. Relying on logics and their descriptive features, a concept can be seen as an idea and 
the idea can be transformed into a hypothesis in order to correspond to a distinct entity (or even to a group of 
entities) or to its (their) essential features. The ideas determine the application(s) of terms and phrases. It’s 
really important to say that any idea is a significant part in the use of reason and language. These 
characteristics and properties are being applied in order to support the metaphorical usages of concepts in 
machine applications. In fact the existing linkages between mental images and linguistic expressions can be 
mapped (be transformed) as multiple ideas into hypotheses in order to determine different applications in 
artificial systems. As mentioned, a concept can be expressible in some concept description languages and it’s 
possible only in virtue of terminologies. In fact, various concepts and the relationships between them can be 
used to establish the fundamental terminologies adopted in a modelled conceptual domain regarding the 
hierarchical structures. According to the characteristics of human ideas, when a human being forms6 an idea 
from its examples, s(he) gets to know more than just some definitions. This demonstrates the deep learning 
rather than superficial knowledge, see [Parker (2008)]. I shall emphasise that the human learner is the 
developer of her/his personal conceptions over the individually designed schemata. In my opinion, the 
relationships between ‘Kantian account of schemata’ and the ‘empirical concepts’ supports the human’s 
mental representations of the objects. It also sees a ‘pure concept of the understanding’ as a characteristic and 
predicate of an object that can express what has been said about that object. The first one employs schemata 
and the second one employs transcendental schemata. In fact, this is how a learner deals with fundamental 
concepts within constructivist learning. Accordingly, the leaner employs inductive rules to expand her/his 
                                               
2
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3
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4
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5
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6
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general ideas into more specified ones. The generalisation of various specified hypotheses (based on ideas) 
supports the learner in discovering new hypotheses and generating new ideas. S(he) searches for and lists 
attributes and properties that can be used to distinguish exemplars (of various hypotheses) from non 
exemplars. But what s(he) really does is more than just specifying and generalising from different examples; 
S(he) is highly concerned with identifying and relating the induced examples. Let me be more specific. As 
mentioned in 2.2, a machine with regard to the given set of examples and its background knowledge finds 
hypotheses. The logical description of a concept, which arises during the knowledge acquisition and learning 
processes, is called a hypothesis, since it is a experimental explanation of why the objects are members (or 
non-members) of the hypotheses (concepts). Also, considering a concept as a hypothesis, if an example 
belongs to a hypothesis, we are able to conclude that the hypothesis covers the example. Then, the example 
has all features and characteristics of that concept, see [Baader (2003)].  
3.1 Concepts in the Common Ground between Human Constructivist Learning 
and Machine ICL  
Obviously, there is an important characteristic of concepts held in common ground. The concepts in the 
common ground are the images of the Idea transformations (the transformations from human being into 
machine). The mappings epitomise humans’ conceptual representations and generate hypotheses. In the 
common ground a concept is a specialised or generalised experience. The concepts could be recognised by 
their instances that are other concepts as well and they all can be represented in different hierarchies. In 
human scientific approaches an experimental explanation of why some objects are the members of a concept 
may support learners in representing their own ideas and in providing ideal (and conceptual) representations. 
In fact, the quality and the modality of the concept representation is affected by observing ‘empirical 
concepts’ and the ‘pure concept of understanding’ with regard to a Kantian account of schemata and 
transcendental schemata. On the other hand, in machine learning approaches, a machine generates the 
represented concept from its given instances. In the common ground, an experimental and empirical 
explanation of WhyNess of existence of some ‘concepts, ideas and hypotheses’ as the instances of other 
‘concepts, ideas and hypotheses’ can provide a strong background for improving the quality of 
conceptualisations. Here are a number of transformations (from human into machine) and reflections (of 
human in machine) that make a conceptual and epistemological connection between human learning and 
machine learning:  
• Transformation of a human being’s knowledge and knowings into multiple principles (and axioms) in 
machines that are mainly object-oriented. Accordingly, the human being’s knowings get classified into 
the specified classes (and under the determined labels) in machine’s knowledge base.   
• Transformation of a human being’s experimental and empirical achievements into various categories of 
positive and negative examples in machines. Thus the human being’s experiments get divided into 
exemplars  and non-exemplars of the specified classes with determined labels.    
• Transformation of a human being’s real ‘problems’, real ‘tasks for solving problems’ and real 
‘performances’ into provided classes with the same labels (Problem, Task and Performance) in 
machines.  
• The reflection of human learning and knowledge acquisition in machines and artificial agents. This 
reflection is equivalent to transforming a taken metaphorical image of learning and knowledge 
acquisition into machines and artificial agents.  
• The reflection of human concepts in the hypotheses. The linkages between a human being’s mental 
representations and linguistic expressions (and descriptions) are getting mapped as some ideas into 
hypotheses in machines. They correspond to multiple entities or to their essential features in order to  
express different significant parts in the use of reasons and languages. 
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• The reflection of humans’ conceptual representations in hypothesis representations and representation of 
hierarchy of hypotheses in machines’ knowledge bases. 
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this article I have focused on a conceptual and epistemological linkage between concept-based human 
learning and concept-based machine learning. Regarding the structures of human oriented sciences and 
information sciences and according to the fact that human oriented sciences and information sciences support 
distinct types of frameworks, I have had to specify and to analyse knowledge, knowledge acquisition and 
learning from two separated points of view. In human systems, knowledge acquisition is a reflective activity 
that enables a human being to draw upon her/his experiences and background knowledge to understand, 
conceptualise and evaluate the present, so as to build up and shape her/his future actions and to construct and 
develop new knowledge. On the other hand, a machine program is said to learn (and acquire knowledge) 
from an experience if there is a set of tasks and a performance measure for it, and also if its performance at 
those tasks, as measured, improves with its given experiences. In this article, according to (i) constructivism 
as a model of knowing and a theory of learning and constructionism as a theory of conceptualising learning, 
and (ii) inductive concept learning as a supervised machine learning paradigm, I have focused on building a 
conceptual linkage between human learning and machine learning. The constructivist and constructionist 
theories of human learning and the inductive concept [machine] learning paradigm are all shaped based upon 
concepts. The first two are focusing on concepts and conceptual representations and the third one focuses on 
representing concepts in informations sciences within electronic systems for hypothesis representation and 
hypothesis generation. My main concern has been analysing concept representations in the mentioned 
frameworks and on their common ground. A concept can be seen as a linkage between linguistic expressions 
and the mental images that a human has in mind. It can be observed as an idea and be transformed into a 
hypothesis in order to be corresponded to entities or to their essential features. In fact, schemata provide 
proper backgrounds for the learner’s concept (and conceptual) representations. A Kantian account of 
schemata sees the empirical concepts in the human’s mental representation of the objects. It also sees a pure 
concept of the understanding as a characteristic and predicate of an object. It can express what has been said 
about a thing. The first one employs schemata and the second one employs transcendental schemata. In fact, 
this is how a learner deals with fundamental concepts within constructivist learning and transforms her/his 
concepts into multiple hypotheses  in order to be applied by inductive concept learning frameworks in 
machines.  
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